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Abstract
We collect and analyze the darkweb (a.k.a. the “onionweb”) hyperlink graph. We find properties
highly dissimilar to the well-studied world wide web hyperlink graph; for example, our analysis
finds that >87% of darkweb sites never link to another site. We compare our results to prior
work on world-wide-web and speculate about reasons for their differences. We conclude that in
the term “darkweb”, the word “web” is a connectivity misnomer. Instead, it is more accurate
to view the darkweb as a set of largely isolated dark silos.
1 Introduction
Graph theory has long been a favored tool for analyzing social relationships [1] as well as quantifying
engineering properties such as searchability [2]. For both reasons, there have been numerous graph-theoretic
analyses of the World Wide Web (www) from the seminal [3–7] to the modern [8]. Motivated by curiosity, we
repeat these analyses for the notorious “darkweb”. The darkweb is sometimes loosely defined as “anything
seedy on the Internet”, but we define the darkweb strictly, as simply all domains underneath the “.onion”
psuedo-top-level-domain [9], i.e., we define the darkweb to be synonymous with the onionweb.
The darkweb is infamously mysterious, and any insight into it for both harnessing it or informing social
policy is welcome. As far as we know we are among [10,11] the first to analyse the darkweb through graph
theory. We analyze the darkweb foremost because it’s an interesting unexplored dataset, and second because,
on the face of it, the world-wide-web and the darkweb are immensely similiar—both are browsed through a
standard web-browser. Therefore any differences between the structure of the darkweb versus the www likely
indicate something about the societies inhabiting each. For comparable work on the world-wide-web, see
especially [12] and [13].
Newcomers are often confused about the properties of the onionweb. Put simply, the onionweb is subset of
the web where websites are identified not by a human-readable hostname (e.g., yahoo.com) or by a IP number
(e.g., 206.190.36.45), but by a randomly generated 16-character address (specifically, a hash fingerprint). Each
website can be accessed via its hash, but it is very difficult to learn the IP number of a website from its hash.
The “dark” part means that, even though the website is accessible (via its hash), its IP number remains
hidden. Without an IP number, it is exceedingly difficult to trace the geographical origin of a communication.
2 Data Collection
Crawling the darkweb is not much harder than crawling the regular web. In our case, we crawled the darkweb
through the popular tor2web proxy onion.link. Onion.link does all of the interfacing with Tor, and one can
crawl all darkweb pages not requiring a login simply by setting a standard crawler to specifically crawl the
domain *.onion.link. Darkweb pages are written in the same HTML language as the regular web, and we
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crawled onion.link using the commercial service scrapinghub.com. Starting from two popular lists of darkweb
sites,1 we accessed each page and crawled all linked pages using breadth-first search.
Most graph-theoretic analyses of the www consider the page-level, i.e., each node is an individual URL.
The page-level description is important for engineering issues like crawlability, and one could certainly do a
page-level analysis of the darkweb, however, it’s unclear how informative this level of description is on social
behavior—the page-level graph is influenced more by the various choices of content management system than
anything social.
Because of this, we follow [13] to aggregate by second-level domain (for the onionweb the second-level domain
is equivalent to [13]’s “pay-level domain”). This means that links within a second-level domain are ignored as
socially irrelevant self-connections. In our darkweb graph, each vertex is a domain and every directed edge
from u→ v means there exists a page within domain u linking to a page within domain v. The weight of the
edge from u→ v is the number of pages on domain u linking to pages on domain v.
The Tor Project Inc., the creators and custodians of the darkweb, maintain basic darkweb statistics [14].
According to them, there are ∼60, 000 distinct, active .onion addresses. However, in our analysis we found
merely 7, 178 active .onion domains. We attribute this high-discrepancy to various messaging services—
particularly TorChat [15], Tor Messenger [16], and Ricochet [17]. In all of these services, each user is identified
by a unique .onion domain.
The darkweb has a notoriously high attrition rate—sites regularly appear and disappear. This creates a
substantial confound as there will be links to .onion domains that no longer exist. To account for this, we
only include sites which responded. I.e., if we discover a link to a page on domain v, but domain v could
not be reached after >10 attempts across November 2016–February 2017, we delete node v and all edges to
node v. In our analysis, before pruning nonresponding domains we found a graph of 13,117 nodes and 39,283
edges. After pruning, we have a graph of 7, 178 nodes and 25, 104 edges (55% and 64% respectively). In all
results, we refer to this graph pruned of nonresponding domains as simply “the darkweb graph”.
3 Graph-theoretic Results
The darkweb graph consists of exactly one weakly connected component (WCC)2 of 7, 178 nodes and 25, 104
edges.
The first step is to quanitatively analyze the degree distributions, which we do in Figure 1. Figures 1a, 1b,
and 1d vaguely resemble a powerlaw, but the plfit tool using the methods from [18] report there’s not
enough orders of magnitude in the data to affirm or deny a powerlaw. In Figure 1a we see that ∼30% of
domains have exactly one incoming link—of which 62% come from one of the five largest out-degree hubs.
Intrigued by the impact of these five large out-degree hubs, we found that almost all nodes (78%) received a
connection from at least one of them. For those curious about these specifics of these high out-degree hubs,
the top fifteen hubs are listed in the Appendix (Table 2). In Figure 1b we see our most striking feature—that
fully 87% of sites do not link to any other site. This sole feature has immense impact on all graph-theoretic
measures. In Figure 1c we see that >98% of domains are tied for the lowest pagerank [19] of 2.095e-4. In
Figure 1d, we seen that when a site does link another, 32% of the time it’s only a single page linking out. All
together, the onionweb is a sparse hub-and-spoke place.
Our second result is a bow-tie decomposition from [21], shown in Figure 2. A bowtie decomposition divides
the nodes of a directed graph into six disjoint parts, they are:
1. CORE — Also called the “Largest Strongly Connected Component”. It is defined as the largest
subset of nodes such that there exists a directed path (both directions—from u→ · · · → v as well as
v → · · · → u) between every pair of nodes in the set.
2. IN — The set of nodes, excluding those in the CORE, that are ancestors of a CORE node.
3. OUT — The set of nodes, excluding those in the CORE, that are descendants of a CORE node.
4. TUBES — The set of nodes, excluding those in the CORE, IN, and OUT, who have an ancestor in
IN as well as a descendant in OUT.
1http://directoryvi6plzm.onion and https://ahmia.fi/onions/
2A Weakly Connected Component is defined as a subset of a graph where every node in the subset, ignoring edge
direction, can reach every other node in the subset. Finding exactly one weakly connected component is entailed by
our original list of seed domains itself being part of the darkweb.
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Figure 1: The distribution of the in-degree, out-degree, pagerank, and edgeweights. In Figure 1c we exclude
the three domains with the highest pagerank (they are listed in Table 3 in the Appendix) because they are
such extreme outliers. For all plots with a log-scale axis, we follow following [8, 13] to use the Fibonacci
binning from [20].
5. TENDRILS — Nodes that have an ancestor in IN but do not have a descendant in OUT. Also, nodes
that have a descendant in OUT but do not have an ancestor in IN.
6. DISCONNECTED — Everything else.
We compare our results to the www results from [8,12,13]. We chose these reference points due to the size of
their crawls and the rigor of their analyses. The most obvious difference between the world-web-web and
the darkweb is that the darkweb only contains a CORE and an OUT component. We attribute this to the
extraordinarily low out-degrees from Figure 1b. For the curious, the top 50 nodes of the CORE are provided
in the Appendix (Table 4).
For our third result, we examine the darkweb’s internal connectivity via shortest-path-length (SPL), shown in
Figure 3. First, for all pairs of nodes {u, v} in the darkweb, only 8.11% are connected by a directed path from
u→ · · · → v or v → · · · → u. This is drastically lower than the ∼43.42% found in the www [13]. We again
attribute this to the low out-degree per Figure 1b. Of the connected pairs, the darkweb’s average shortest
path length is 4.35 compared to the 4.27 in the world-wide-web [13]. It’s surprising to see a graph as small as
the darkweb have a higher mean SPL than the entire world-wide-web, and is a testament to how sparse the
darkweb graph really is. In Figure 3c we plot the distribution of SPLs for the 297 nodes of the CORE, to
our surprise, the mean SPL within the CORE is 3.97, only 9% less than the entire darkweb. From this we
conclude the CORE is not any kind of densely interconnected core.
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Figure 2: Bow-tie decomposition comparing the www [13] versus the darkweb.
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Figure 3: Comparing shortest path lengths between the world-wide-web and the darkweb considering directed
edges. Whereas in the www 56.65% of node pairs have have ∞ path-length (no path connecting them), in
the darkweb 91.89% of node-pairs have no path connecting them. Moreover, even within that 8.11% of pairs
with a directed path between them, the darkweb’s average SPL (µ = 4.35) is higher than that of the www
(µ = 4.27).
3.1 Robustness and Fragility
In Figure 4 we show our fourth result—how quickly the entire network (WCC) as well as the CORE
disintegrates under node removal. In Figures 4a and 4b we see the familiar resistance to random failure yoked
with fragility to targeted attacks in the spirit of [22]. In Figure 4b, we see that, unlike the www [13], the
WCC is more susceptible to high in-degree deletions than the CORE. This elaborates the view from Figure 3c
that the CORE is, in addition to not being strongly interconnected, is also not any kind of high in-degree
nexus.
Figures 4c and 4d show the breakdown when removing central nodes. In Figure 4c the CORE is largely
unaffected by low centrality deletions. In Figure 4d we see that although the CORE isn’t disproportionately
held together by high in-degree nodes, it is dominated by very central nodes.
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Comparing Figures 4b and 4f, we see the CORE relative to the entire network consists of more high-pagerank
nodes than high in-degree nodes. This implies CORE nodes are not created by their high-indegree (Figure 4b),
but by their high centrality, amply corroborated by Figures 4c and 4d. Likewise, Figure 4e recapitulates
Figure 4a, that nodes with especially low in-degree or centrality are, unsurprisingly, not in the CORE.
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Figure 4: Deleting nodes from the darkweb graph and seeing how quickly the WCC and CORE disintegrate.
In all plots, we shuffled the order of nodes with the same value until reaching stable statistics, e.g., in
Figure 1c, 98% of nodes are tied for the lowest pagerank; so when removing only 10% of the nodes (e.g.,
Figure 4e), it’s ambiguous which nodes should be deleted first. So in our analysis we shuffled the ordering of
the nodes with the same value and recomputed sizes of the WCC/CORE until the median was stable.
Given the hub-and-spoke nature of the graph, if the goal was destroy the connectivity of the hyperlink graph,
the most effective method would be to attack the central hubs—but which hubs? In the Appendix (Figure 7)
5
we see the WCC breaks down at roughly the same rate when removing either the high in-degree or high
out-degree nodes.
3.2 Reciprocal Connections
In [12] they stress the importance of reciprocal connections in maintaining the www’s graph properties.
We compute two of their measures. First, we compute [12]’s measure 〈kinkout〉〈kin〉〈kout〉 =
E[kinkout]
E[kin]E[kout] , to quantify
in-degree and out-degree’s deviation from independence. For the darkweb, we arrive at 〈kinkout〉〈kin〉〈kout〉 = 3.70.
This is in the middle of the road of prior estimates of the www, and means that the out-degree and in-degree
are positively correlated. To be a better view, we plot the average out-degree as a function of the in-degree,
given as,
〈kout(kin)〉 = 1
Nkin
∑
i∈Υ(kin)
kout,i , (1)
which is simply “For all nodes of a given in-degree, what is the mean out-degree?”. The results are given
in Figure 5; in short, in the darkweb there’s no obvious pattern to the relationship between in-degree and
out-degree, and is in fact mostly flat.
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200
in-degree
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
M
ea
n 
ou
t-d
eg
re
e
(a) With red outliers
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
in-degree
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
M
ea
n 
ou
t-d
eg
re
e
(b) Without red outliers
Figure 5: Average out-degree as a function of the in-degree. Figure 5b is the same as 5a but pruned of the
three red outliers in 5a.
4 Discussion
Casual inspection of Figure 1 shows that the darkweb is indeed a very different graph than what in theworld
wide web [3–8, 12]—particularly, the glaring fact of so little linking to other websites (Figure 1b). The
fundamental question is why there’s so little linking. For this, the two major explanations are:
• The technological explanation. In the darkweb, sites go up and go down all the time. Why bother
linking if there’s little chance that the destination will still exist?
• The social explanation. As-is, people who create sites on the darkweb are cut from a different
social cloth than those who create sites on the www.
To disambiguate these two we performed a second crawl collecting instances of darkweb sites linking to the
www and compared the relative rates of outbound linking, resulting in Figure 6. From the essentially equal
rates of outbound linking to the www as well as the darkweb, we conclude:
1. The low outbound linking is not due to the notorious impermance of onion sites.
2. If onionsites got drastically more stable, we would still see very low rates of linking.
3. By elimination of the technological explanation, we suggest that people creating darkweb sites are, on
average, simply less social than those creating sites on the www.
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The term “dark web“ is commonplace, but based on our analysis, the “web” is a misnomer. It is more
accurate to view it as a set of dark silos. Unlike the www, the darkweb is a place of isolation. In Table 1 we
summarize our comparison statistics between the www and the darkweb.
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Figure 6: Comparing the rates of the darkweb sites linking to the www versus linking to other darkweb sites,
we see they are essentially the same.
Measure www [13] darkweb
Num nodes 43M 7, 178
Num edges 623M 25, 104
Prop. connected pairs ∼42% 8.11%
Average SPL 4.27 4.35
Edges per node 14.5 3.50
Network diameter* 48 5
Harmonic diameter ∼9.55 232.49
Table 1: Summarized network level properties between the www and the darkweb. Asterisk for the entries
requiring conversion to an undirected graph.
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A Miscellaneous figures
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Domain Title Out-degree In-degree
directoryvi6plzm Tor Directory: A list of onion 5582 1
visitorfi5kl7q7i VisiTOR Search Engine - Tor Hi 4367 18
skunksworkedp2cg A portal containing lists of l 2769 41
cratedvnn5z57xhl The onion crate REBOOT - Tor h 2758 6
gxamjbnu7uknahng The Uncensored Hidden WikiNew 848 13
torvps7kzis5ujfz TorVPS 498 33
zlal32teyptf4tvi Fresh Onions 478 4
hwikis25cffertqe Hidden Wiki 309 15
w363zoq3ylux5rf5 Galaxy2 Social network 294 32
y4yhci7273s2yeqk 조선위키 203 9
auutwvpt2zktxwng Onion Dir 186 25
wikiwarixvouhwyn Light version of original Hidd 180 7
hdwikicorldcisiy HD Wiki 168 22
ntcixulmms4275vi Hidden Wiki - Outdated and fil 150 6
soupkso3la22ltl3 This site contains an onion bl 146 6
torwikignoueupfm TorWiki 128 18
vxzzqqdt54racf3i Tor2Dir: A onion sites list 119 3
godnotaba36dsabv Годнотаба — мониторинг годноты 115 5
pduvohnvbtzph6sg pduvohnvbtzph6sg.onion 103 1
rbaco5flcou46wpd Welcome To Dark Web Links & M 102 5
Table 2: The top 15 out-degree hubs on the darkweb.
PageRank In-degree Harmonic Centrality
Freedom Hosting II Freedom Hosting II Freedom Hosting II
Blockchain - Bitcoin Bloc Blockchain - Bitcoin Bloc Blockchain - Bitcoin Bloc
Outlaw Market DuckDuckGo - Search engin Tor Ads
TorShops † Grams † Grams †
TorLinks — .onion Link Li † SIGAINT DuckDuckGo - Search engin
Dream Market - Dark web m † TORCH: Tor Search Engine † SIGAINT
Tor Ads Tor Ads TORCH: Tor Search Engine †
Valhalla Market † TorShops † Alphabay Market
Silkkitie Market † main.paraZite # Anarchy † main.paraZite # Anarchy †
DreamMarket Forum † Dream Market - Dark web m † TorBox - Mailservice
TOR FREE SPEECH!ask anyth Alphabay Market Dream Market - Dark web m †
On my website you can upl † TorBox - Mailservice TorShops †
Alphabay Market The Hidden Wiki - Outdate † OnionWallet
Скрытые Ответы On my website you can upl † USA Citizenship †
Hidden Answers pt OnionWallet The Hidden Wiki - Outdate †
HD Wiki † HTTP File Server Example rendezvous points
Grams † The Pirate Bay - Torrent Apples 4 Bitcoin †
DeepDotWeb - Surfacing th † A portal containing lists † On my website you can upl †
OnionDir - Deep Web Link † Example rendezvous points HTTP File Server
The Darknet Company USA Citizenship † *** Deep Web Radio ***
OUTLAW Market not Evil - Search Tor EasyCoin bitcoin wallet m
Carding Community *** Deep Web Radio *** TorLinks — .onion Link Li †
Table 3: The top 20 sites of the darkweb using PageRank, In-degree, and Harmonic Centrality. Bolded entries
are present across all three lists. † entries are in the CORE.
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Address Name Pagerank In-degree Out-degree
shopsat2dotfotbs TorShops 6.30e-03 56 1
torlinkbgs6aabns TorLinks — .onion Link List 6.00e-03 34 43
lchudifyeqm4ldjj Dream Market - Dark web market featuring 5.59e-03 54 5
valhallaxmn3fydu Valhalla Market 3.75e-03 23 3
silkkitiehdg5mug Silkkitie Market 3.58e-03 28 7
tmskhzavkycdupbr DreamMarket Forum 3.00e-03 26 6
jd6yhuwcivehvdt4 Dream Market - Dark web market featuring 2.39e-03 23 5
t3e6ly3uoif4zcw2 Dream Market - Dark web market featuring 2.39e-03 23 5
7ep7acrkunzdcw3l Dream Market - Dark web market featuring 2.28e-03 17 4
tt3j2x4k5ycaa5zt On my website you can upload/download fi 1.85e-03 42 53
hdwikicorldcisiy HD Wiki 1.60e-03 22 168
grams7enufi7jmdl Grams 1.60e-03 60 6
deepdot35wvmeyd5 DeepDotWeb - Surfacing the News From The 1.57e-03 28 13
dirnxxdraygbifgc OnionDir - Deep Web Link Directory 1.53e-03 28 65
n2ha26oplph454e6 Welcome To A New Site 1.28e-03 7 1
rbaco5flcou46wpd Welcome To Dark Web Links & More! 1.23e-03 5 102
radiocbsi2q27tob Ra´dio CBS – Comunicac¸o˜es Brasileira de S 9.85e-04 8 12
lwplxqzvmgu43uff Runion - Russian Forum 8.58e-04 13 5
hansamkt2rr6nfg3 HANSA Market 8.36e-04 34 2
wallstyizjhkrvmj Wall Street Market 7.99e-04 11 2
w363zoq3ylux5rf5 Galaxy2 Social network 7.47e-04 32 294
kpynyvym6xqi7wz2 main.paraZite # Anarchy files and Underg 7.13e-04 56 71
bankshopiweol3mv Store 7.00e-04 5 2
zqktlwi4fecvo6ri The Hidden Wiki - Outdated, full of scam 6.95e-04 45 145
chattorci7bcgygp This is ChatTor, the only 100% anonymous 6.75e-04 16 3
xmh57jrzrnw6insl TORCH: Tor Search Engine 6.35e-04 57 9
slpwlkryjujyjhct SleepWalker 6.12e-04 7 2
cocaineo5z66elwy Concerned Cocaine Citizens 6.04e-04 4 5
darkmarabrstwfuh Darkmarket Market 5.78e-04 7 2
x7bwsmcore5fmx56 Darknet Hacking Services 4.64e-04 2 1
torvps7kzis5ujfz TorVPS 4.49e-04 33 498
wikitorcwogtsifs The Hidden Wiki 4.44e-04 11 222
ntcixulmms4275vi Hidden Wiki - Outdated and filled with s 4.40e-04 6 150
mystorew25hgytln Store 4.35e-04 7 6
fantomwf4luxar7u Fantom urls - Forum for paranoids 3.85e-04 4 1
xfnwyig7olypdq5r USA Citizenship 3.67e-04 40 1
vfqnd6mieccqyiit UK Passports 3.55e-04 36 1
deeplinkdeatbml7 DeepLink 3.35e-04 4 11
abbujjh5vqtq77wg Onion Identity 3.35e-04 31 1
54ogum7gwxhtgiya Krang Hidden Base in Tor. Technodrome. B 3.28e-04 27 18
costeirazb2xecgs costeira.i2p.onion - Servidor de downloa 3.21e-04 7 3
allyour4nert7pkh AYB – ur mum XDDDDDDD 3.18e-04 13 17
linkskgiymtyszdb LINKS Onion Web Link Directory - Your co 3.15e-04 10 94
skunksworkedp2cg A portal containing lists of links autom 3.11e-04 41 2769
tfwdi3izigxllure Apples 4 Bitcoin 3.08e-04 39 1
fdwocbsnity6vzwd French Deep Web 3.06e-04 26 8
roothitpesjylrta PT-BR: Site oficial do roothit EN-US: We 3.02e-04 7 1
tuu66yxvrnn3of7l UK Guns and Ammo Store 3.01e-04 31 1
3dbr5t4pygahedms ccpal - ccs - cvv2s - paypal 3.00e-04 31 1
y3fpieiezy2sin4a HQER - High Quality Euro Counterfeits - 3.00e-04 31 1
Table 4: Top 50 domains by Pagerank in the CORE.
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Figure 7: We see that removing the high in-degree and out-degree nodes are about equally effective in
breaking the WCC.
B Peering beneath the Darkweb
Every darkweb domain can be accessed by a site-specified number of “Introduction Points”. These introduction
points and hidden service directories have been explored before [23], but as far as we know, never statistically.
In our analysis, we found that 96.8% of darkweb sites have exactly ≤ 3 introduction points (with 95% having
exactly 3). The most salient fact is that if someone wanted to take down a darkweb site (presumably via
DDOS), 97% of the time the attack would require taking out three publicly known relays. From 8b, the
number of domains served from each Introduction Point decays roughly exponentially.
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(a) Number of introduction points to a darkweb site
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Figure 8: Number of domains found on each HSDir
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